Sharing the Load: How Do Coresident Children Influence the Allocation of Work and Schooling in Northwestern Tanzania? by Hedges, Sophie et al.
1 
 
Sharing the load: how do co-resident children influence the 
allocation of work and schooling in north-western Tanzania? 





Economic and evolutionary models of parental investment often predict education biases towards 
earlier-born children, resulting from either household resource dilution or parental preference. Previous 
research, however, has not always found these predicted biases. This may be because, in societies 
where children work, older children are more efficient at household tasks and substitute for younger 
children, whose time can then be allocated to school. The role of labour substitution in determining 
children’s schooling remains uncertain, however, because few studies have simultaneously considered 
intrahousehold variation in both children’s education and work. Here, we investigate the influence of 
co-resident children on education, work and leisure in north-western Tanzania, using detailed time use 
data collected from multiple children per household (n=1,273). We find that age order (relative age, 
compared to co-resident children) within the household is associated with children’s time allocation, but 
these patterns differ by gender. Relatively young girls do less work, have more leisure time, and have 
greater odds of school enrolment than older girls. We suggest this results from labour substitution: 
older girls are more efficient workers, freeing younger girls’ time for education and leisure. 
Conversely, relatively older boys have the highest odds of school enrolment among co-resident boys, 
possibly reflecting traditional norms regarding household work allocation and age hierarchies. Gender 
is also important in household work allocation: boys who co-reside with more girls do fewer household 
chores. We conclude that considering children as both producers and consumers is critical to 





Time allocation can differ substantially between co-resident children, especially in modernizing 3 
populations where children attend school alongside making productive contributions to the household 4 
economy. This variation can have important long-term implications for individual wellbeing, economic 5 
and reproductive success; children’s time in both school and work offers opportunities for human capital 6 
generation and potential exposure to risks such as the lack of parental supervision or dangerous work 7 
activities (Bock, 2002). Demographers, economists and anthropologists have long been interested in 8 
intra-household differences in time allocation, including variation by birth order and age order (i.e. 9 
relative age within a household). Time allocated to education is frequently framed as a measure of 10 
parental investment, as it is costly both directly, and through the opportunity costs of children’s lost 11 
work contributions. Taking this perspective, both economists and evolutionary anthropologists have 12 
predicted that earlier-born children will be favoured by parents, either as an inadvertent consequence 13 
of household resource dilution or strategic parental preference (Edmonds, 2006; Hertwig, Davis, & 14 
Sulloway, 2002; Jeon, 2008).  15 
Economic models of parental investment focus on the role of siblings as competitors for finite parental 16 
resources, predicting a trade-off between the number of dependents and investment in each one, i.e. a 17 
child quantity-quality trade-off (Becker, 1960). In studies of educational outcomes, this perspective is 18 
also referred to as resource dilution theory (Downey, 2001). Children in larger families are predicted 19 
to be disadvantaged, with later-born children being particularly disadvantaged as, unlike earlier-born 20 
offspring, they experience sibling competition for finite parental resources without a period of 21 
exclusive parental investment (Hertwig et al., 2002; Parish & Willis, 1993). Later-born children may 22 
also experience a period of lower competition after older siblings leave the parental home, but 23 
exclusivity in parental attention is generally deemed more influential in early childhood (Hertwig et al., 24 
2002). Families may also get wealthier over their life cycle, which could advantage later-borns, but 25 
this effect is better considered an impact of parental age, not birth order (Lawson & Mace, 2009).  26 
Evolutionary anthropologists have also modelled the trade-off between quantity and quality of 27 
offspring (Lawson & Borgerhoff Mulder, 2016), generally predicting early-born advantage. An 28 
evolutionary perspective predicts that parents act to maximize their inclusive fitness i.e. the long-term 29 
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production of descendants via both direct reproduction and assisting their relatives. As a consequence, 30 
parents are predicted to bias investment towards offspring with the greatest likelihood of survival and 31 
successful reproduction (Trivers, 1972). Within a sibship, earlier-born children are closer to maturity, 32 
and have lower mortality risk than later-borns, and therefore have greater ‘reproductive value’ 33 
(expected number of future children), so that parents can be more certain of the payoff to their 34 
investment (Jeon, 2008; Sear, 2011). Furthermore, biased investment in earlier-born children is 35 
anticipated in growing populations, where fitness is maximized by minimizing generation time (Jones & 36 
Bliege Bird, 2014). 37 
A close focus on parental investment however neglects the fact that in subsistence contexts, children are 38 
typically producers as well as consumers (Kramer, 2002, 2005, 2011). Indeed, opposing predictions 39 
about time allocation to education arise from models taking children’s work as their starting point, with 40 
parents anticipated to allocate children’s time to optimize overall household production. Children’s time 41 
allocation changes with age; very young children devote time largely to leisure, as they begin to 42 
develop skills by learning through play. Their ability to carry out productive work increases with age 43 
as they gain strength and skill, increasingly specializing in gender-specific tasks (Bock, 2002; Gurven & 44 
Kaplan, 2006; Kramer, 2005). In households with multiple children, earlier-born (i.e. relatively older) 45 
children, are expected to be more productive (and in the case of paid work command higher wages), 46 
and consequently are predicted to be preferentially allocated work. If earlier-born children are more 47 
likely to be allocated work, this should free later-born children’s time to attend school. A focus on 48 
labour substitution therefore predicts, in opposition to parental investment biases, that later-born 49 
children will be more likely to be enrolled in school (Basu & Van, 1998; Edmonds, 2006; Lee & 50 
Kramer, 2002). 51 
With models of parental investment and labour substitution making contrasting predictions, our 52 
attention turns to the empirical literature. As we review below, existing research finds mixed results 53 
about the influence of co-resident children on children’s time spent in school and work. This may be 54 
because it mostly focuses on either education or work, rather than considering the two simultaneously – 55 
preventing an explicit consideration of the role of labour substitution in determining education 56 
outcomes. Here, we take a holistic approach to children’s time allocation and simultaneously investigate 57 
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how the presence of co-resident children influence children’s time spent in education, work and leisure 58 
in north-west Tanzania. As such, we overcome an important methodological limitation common across 59 
many prior studies of children’s time allocation. We also promote theoretical synthesis by using an 60 
adapted version of embodied capital theory, an integrated theoretical framework that draws on both 61 
economic and evolutionary models of parental investment (Kaplan, 1996; Kaplan, Bock, & Hooper, 62 
2015). Specifically, embodied capital theory predicts that parents will strategically allocate time and 63 
resources across the household in order to optimize long-term investment in children. This parental 64 
investment is aimed at maximizing parental reproductive success (or at least parental behaviour is 65 
shaped by mechanisms which in the past have maximized reproductive success). Despite this assumption 66 
that individuals’ behaviour is shaped by maximizing long-term reproductive success, in practice other 67 
outcomes, such as education or income, are typically used as proxies of fitness, aligning these models 68 
with conventional economic approaches (Kaplan et al., 2015). The economic literature also draws 69 
attention towards the short-term needs of the household, highlighting the trade-off between producing 70 
enough to sustain the household in the present, while investing in children’s education and skills for the 71 
future (Edmonds, 2006). Here, then, we assume that children’s time allocation is shaped both by 72 
parental investment biases towards those who will produce the greatest returns in the long-term, and 73 
by decisions to preferentially allocate work to those who are currently most productive, or for whom 74 
other uses of time are least valuable (note such allocation may be influenced by decisions taken by 75 
both parents and children) (Gurven & Kaplan, 2006).  76 
Below we review evidence regarding birth/age order and children’s time allocation from previous 77 
empirical studies of low-income settings where education and children’s work coexist. We then outline 78 
our predictions regarding educational investment and children’s work at our study site, where we 79 
anticipate strong scope for labour substitution effects in children’s time allocation, given the important 80 
contributions children make to the household economy in this setting (Hedges, Sear, Todd, Urassa, & 81 
Lawson, 2018). We also extend prior research by investigating the influence of all co-resident 82 
children, not just siblings, because in this context (as in many others), a high proportion of children are 83 
co-resident with children other than siblings. Throughout we integrate a consideration of the gendered 84 
aspects of labour substitution; stratifying our analyses by gender and testing whether or not co-85 
resident children of the same and opposite sex play specific roles. Prior research in this region confirms 86 
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that children’s work is highly gendered, with girls taking on the majority of household tasks and boys 87 
predominantly involved in farming work (Hedges et al., 2018). As such our study has implications for 88 
understanding both birth/age order and gender biases in modernizing contexts. 89 
Prior research on birth/age order and children’s time allocation 90 
Studies of high-fertility subsistence populations have reported evidence both for preferred investment 91 
in earlier-born children and for labour substitution, with the work of earlier-born children freeing up 92 
time for later-born children. For example, in many contexts later-born males receive lower wealth 93 
transfers at marriage and inheritance (e.g. Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998; Gibson & Gurmu, 2011; Hrdy & 94 
Judge, 1993; Mace, 1996). On the other hand, detailed longitudinal work on children’s work among 95 
Mayan agriculturalists highlights the role of labour substitution with children taking on different roles as 96 
a family matures.  Here, earlier-born children’s work subsidizes later-born children while they are too 97 
young to contribute; then as later-born children grow and become more productive, earlier-born 98 
children leave home (Kramer 2005; Lee & Kramer 2002). These results are not necessarily 99 
incompatible, because investment in adulthood (e.g. wealth transfers at marriage) does not conflict with 100 
time allocation during childhood.  101 
Educational investment on the other hand necessarily conflicts with work contributions to the household. 102 
Studies from Brazil, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Nepal, and Ethiopia suggest that investment and time 103 
allocation patterns reflect labour substitution, with earlier-born children working more and being less 104 
likely to be in school (Dammert, 2010; Emerson & Souza, 2008; Fafchamps & Wahba, 2006; Haile & 105 
Haile, 2012). Other studies, generally using aggregated, nationally-representative datasets, have 106 
found that earlier-born children had lower educational attainment or reduced school attendance and 107 
have attributed this to hypothesized labour substitution effects (Huisman & Smits, 2015; Kumar, 2016; 108 
Lindskog, 2013; Lloyd & Gage-Brandon, 1994; Parish & Willis, 1993; Rammohan & Dancer, 2008; 109 
Ryan, Koczberski, Curry, & Germis, 2017). However, smaller-scale studies in Ethiopia, Malawi, and 110 
Tanzania found that later-born children received less educational investment (Gibson & Lawson, 2011; 111 
Gibson & Sear, 2010; Hedges, Borgerhoff Mulder, James, & Lawson, 2016).  These early-born biases 112 
were more evident in wealthier households, perhaps because demand for child labour is lower among 113 
these households reducing scope for labour substitution. 114 
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All of these studies are cross-sectional, making it difficult to account for how households may be 115 
strategic about the timing of investment and household time allocation, potentially levelling out 116 
differences between children over the household life cycle. Studies in South Africa and Malawi have 117 
reported that earlier-born children progress through school faster, suggesting that parents may invest 118 
more in older children in order that they complete their education faster, then become available to 119 
substitute for younger children’s work (Liddell, Barrett, & Henzi, 2003; Moyi, 2010). Similarly, in 120 
Kenya, earlier-born children attained more education, but this effect was lessened in larger families, 121 
possibly because older siblings who complete their education are able to work and thus subsidize 122 
younger siblings’ education (Gomes, 1984). 123 
Labour substitution effects are therefore not mutually exclusive from investment biases, and may differ 124 
by gender if boys and girls have different patterns of work. In many modernizing contexts, the work 125 
that children do is predominantly household chores and childcare. These are often female 126 
responsibilities, and girls generally do more work than boys, meaning labour substitution effects may 127 
be seen more strongly for girls than for boys (Edmonds, 2006). Several studies have found evidence of 128 
earlier-born disadvantage in schooling or workload for girls but not boys (Dammert, 2010; Edmonds, 129 
2006; Glick & Sahn, 2000; Heissler & Porter, 2010; Kevane & Levine, 2003; Parish & Willis, 1993; 130 
Rosati & Rossi, 2003). Additionally, some studies have suggested that having sisters is particularly 131 
beneficial for schooling (Canagarajah & Coulombe, 1993; Morduch, 2000).  132 
The question of how the presence of substitute workers affects children’s work and education thus 133 
remains complicated. As we have noted, a key limitation of previous studies is their focus on education; 134 
very few have examined work patterns within households, making it difficult to assess the extent to 135 
which differences by birth order represent labour substitution or effects such as parental investment 136 
biases. Where work is investigated, many studies have looked only at paid or farm work rather than 137 
household chores (e.g. Emerson & Souza, 2008; Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 1995), often using a 138 
binary outcome indicating whether a child works or not, which may obscure the nuances of intra-139 
household time allocation. Studies are also often limited to how biological siblings influence each other 140 
(e.g. Huisman & Smits, 2015), but in contexts with child fostering and alternative living arrangements, 141 
this neglects many of the substitute workers available to children. Finally, while large, nationally-142 
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representative datasets are important in identifying large-scale trends, smaller-scale studies which 143 
compare multiple households within a similar subsistence context avoid the potential for confounding 144 
between individual and group-level variables (i.e. the ecological fallacy) to affect results (Lawson & 145 
Uggla, 2014). We build on previous literature from both anthropology, economics, and demography, 146 
using detailed data on children’s time allocation and education from a Demographic Surveillance Site 147 
situated in an area undergoing rapid modernization in Tanzania. Reflecting the local context that has 148 
high levels of fostering, we include all children of school age within a household. 149 
Setting and predictions 150 
In Tanzania, government primary schools do not charge school fees, but families pay costs such as 151 
uniforms, stationery and exam fees. Children generally start school at age seven, though delayed 152 
entry and grade repetition are common. There are seven years of primary education, four years of 153 
basic secondary education, and two years of advanced secondary education. Primary school is taught 154 
in Swahili, which may present a barrier for children who speak their local language at home; in this 155 
study, many households speak Sukuma, particularly in the rural village. Further language barriers are 156 
encountered at secondary level, where all classes and exams are conducted in English, with a negative 157 
impact on students’ learning and academic achievement (Brock-Utne, 2007).  158 
The quality of schooling provided is a cause for concern in Tanzania; pass rates for secondary school 159 
exams being as low as 40% and many children leaving primary school unable to read or write 160 
(Hivos/Twaweza, 2014; Pritchett, 2013). In interviews with local teachers the lack of school 161 
infrastructure and equipment was frequently cited as a challenge, with teachers struggling to maintain 162 
discipline in large classes. During focus groups adolescents and parents cited the long distances to 163 
school and harsh punishments, including beatings, as challenges to school attendance. Youth 164 
unemployment is common, and some parents complained that having sent their children to school, they 165 
were no longer willing to help with farming activities and often sat idle at home.  166 
In Tanzania fostering is common, even for children who have both parents alive, with many children 167 
residing with grandparents or other relatives to provide better access to school, provide help with 168 
household work, or just because of family preferences (see also Lawson et al., 2017). In our sample 169 
only 65% of children are the biological child of the household head meaning a large proportion of 170 
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children live in alternative arrangements. Even among children who are the biological child of the 171 
household head many live with school-age step-siblings, half-siblings, cousins, or nieces and nephews. 172 
We therefore do not focus on number of siblings or birth order but instead look at age rank within the 173 
household, defining children resident in the same household as potential ‘substitute labourers’ according 174 
to their relative age and gender. We derive predictions on the basis of anticipated labour substitution 175 
effects, hypothesizing that the availability of substitute workers within a household reduces the amount 176 
of time a child spends working, and increases the likelihood of a child being enrolled in school.  177 
Children who are relatively older within the household are likely to be more efficient than younger 178 
children at various productive tasks, and previous research shows an increase in work with age 179 
(Hedges et al., 2018). We therefore expect that households will favour allocating older children’s time 180 
to production, freeing younger children’s time for school, and predict that (1) increasing age order (i.e. 181 
living with older children) will be associated with increased probability of enrolment in school; decreased 182 
time spent in work; and increased leisure time. Furthermore, those who are not enrolled in school are 183 
expected to substitute for the labour of children who are enrolled. Thus, we predict that (2) those not 184 
enrolled in school will work more when co-resident children are enrolled in school, while schoolchildren will 185 
work less when co-resident children are not enrolled. Finally, in Sukuma society, work is gendered, with 186 
domestic work and childcare predominantly carried out by girls and women, and farm work and cattle 187 
herding being male activities ( Hedges et al., 2018; Varkevisser, 1973). For both enrolled and 188 
unenrolled children, it is therefore predicted that (3) the number of opposite-gender children will reduce 189 
time spent in gender-inappropriate work, i.e. the number of girls will reduce the time boys spend in 190 
household chores, while in households that farm or keep cattle, the number of boys will reduce the time 191 
girls spend in farm work. These predictions assume that within a household, members have similar 192 
priorities, and that children have similar levels of autonomy in their time allocation. However, these 193 
assumptions may not hold completely in this context. In focus groups, we heard several anecdotes of 194 
conflict between parents or guardians and children who did not wish to attend school, and also of 195 
children who wanted to attend school but could not due to responsibilities at home. Additionally, it was 196 
noted that older teenagers, particularly boys, have more freedom in determining their time allocation. 197 
Age and gender effects may therefore also reflect differing levels of autonomy between children.  198 
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Data and Methods 199 
Data collection 200 
The data collection for this study took place at the Kisesa Health and Demographic Surveillance Site 201 
(HDSS) in Mwanza region, north-western Tanzania. The HDSS was set up in 1994 to collect 202 
demographic data in an area comprising six villages (Kishamawe et al., 2015). For this study, data 203 
were collected in two of the six villages, representing the most and least rural villages in the HDSS. The 204 
Sukuma are the main ethnic group in the area. Traditionally households were reliant on farming and 205 
cattle herding, living in dispersed homesteads, but livelihoods have now diversified, with many families 206 
engaged in petty trading and small businesses. The least rural village is now better described as a 207 
town, situated on a main road, with public transport links to the city and a central market. In the most 208 
rural village, the majority of households continue to farm and many own cattle (Hedges et al., in press). 209 
The HDSS provided a sampling frame of all households at the previous round of data collection, 210 
together with the ages of household members. This sampling frame was then restricted to households 211 
with members aged between 7 and 19 (the ages of formal schooling in Tanzania), from which 550 212 
households were randomly sampled. Households are self-defined in the HDSS as “a group of people 213 
living together in the same compound, who regularly eat together from the same pot” (Kishamawe et 214 
al., 2015). Data collection was carried out by three fieldworkers who had all previously been trained 215 
and employed at the DSS (only two conducted surveys at any given time). Fieldworkers each had one 216 
day of training one-to-one with the lead author who was managing data collection. Training 217 
emphasized the need for consistency across interviews and the need to take a non-judgmental and 218 
sensitive approach, and presented hypothetical scenarios to check for the fieldworker’s understanding 219 
of the goals of the research. At the beginning of the study one fieldworker was trained, then the other 220 
fieldworkers observed a day’s worth of interviews, in addition to office-based training, in order to 221 
ensure a consistent ‘script’ and approach between interviewers.  222 
Household surveys were carried out using Google Nexus 7 tablets with Open Data Kit (ODK) Collect 223 
software (Brunette et al., 2013). The survey recorded information about household members’ age and 224 
gender, adult members’ education and occupation, and the household head’s marital status, ethnicity, 225 
and religion. Then a series of questions was asked about the household’s assets, land ownership and 226 
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uses, livestock ownership, and business involvement. Based on observations made during fieldwork, 227 
assets were defined as ‘basic’ (chair, bed, mosquito net), ‘intermediate’ (bicycle, radio, sofa, cupboard, 228 
clock, or sewing machine), or ‘high-value’ (TV, fridge, or motorbike). This was followed by a set of nine 229 
questions pertaining to food security, based on the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)’s 230 
Household Food Insecurity and Access Scale (Coates, Swindale, & Bilinsky, 2007). This index asks 231 
questions about a household’s food security during the past month, including experiencing anxiety 232 
about food supply, limiting food quality and reducing food quantity, and the frequency with which 233 
these were experienced. For each child in the household aged 7 to 19, an additional survey was 234 
answered by their parent or guardian, collecting information on their parents’ marital status, education, 235 
and occupation, their siblings (though not whether siblings are co-resident), education, and work history.  236 
1,278 children were followed up out of a total of 1,387 eligible children (92.1%). The majority of 237 
those not followed up were away at boarding school (3.8% of total sample) or travelling (2.6%). A 238 
further five children were dropped from the analysis, three who were listed as the spouse of the 239 
household head, and two who were employees of the household. Direct observation of activities 240 
through scan sampling is generally preferable to time diary methods as it avoids recall error and 241 
social desirability bias, and provides a representative description of all activities (Altmann, 1974; 242 
Baksh, 1989; Borgerhoff Mulder & Caro, 1985). However, practical difficulties in conducting scan 243 
samples due to large distances between households and ethical concerns precluded the use of 244 
observation. Many time allocation studies use proxy reports, but this can lead to underestimation of 245 
time spent working (Dammert & Galdo, 2013; Dillon et al. 2010; Janzen, 2015). We therefore asked 246 
children to self-report their activities on the previous weekday (or the previous Friday if the interview 247 
was done on a Monday), from when they woke up until they went to sleep. Time use was recorded 248 
through a diagram, with rows corresponding to different activities, and columns corresponding to half 249 
hour time periods. The time and duration of different activities were indicated by shading the 250 
corresponding cells (Fig. 1). Data from the diagrams were coded into broader categories, including 251 
household chores, farm work, market work, and leisure time (see below). We acknowledge the 252 
problems associated with self-report data, and recall bias associated with time allocation reporting. It 253 
is likely that there may be some overestimation of school enrolment and attendance due to the social 254 
desirability of education in this area. There may also be some error in children’s recall of their time 255 
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allocation, if for example habitual or short-duration activities are overlooked, or if children overreport 256 
time spent working. During interviews, fieldworkers were able to crosscheck some timings, for example 257 
meals or leaving for school, between children within the same household, reducing some recall error. 258 
The short time frame for recall, of a maximum three days previously but primarily just one day, should 259 
also reduce recall error. We include a binary variable indicating whether the time allocation interview 260 
was done on a Monday or another day in time allocation analyses to account for the longer recall 261 
period for children interviewed on a Monday, who were asked about the previous Friday rather than 262 
‘yesterday’ as for other days. 263 
Outcome variables 264 
Whether a child was enrolled in school at the time of the study is used as a binary outcome, enrolled, 265 
where 1 indicates the child was enrolled. Time use was recorded in half-hour blocks, from 5am to 266 
12am, giving a maximum of 38 blocks (equivalent to 19 hours) for any given activity. For each activity 267 
category, the outcome is therefore the total count of half-hour blocks spent in that activity. The activity 268 
categories used are as follows. Education includes travel to and from school, school time, and studying 269 
after school. Household chores include cleaning, cooking, collecting water or fuel, childcare, running 270 
errands, and food processing. Farm work includes cattle herding (also treated as a separate category 271 
in some analyses), working in the fields, feeding animals, and milking. Market work includes any work 272 
done outside the household, for example petty trading, shop keeping, and making things to sell (e.g. 273 
baskets, doughnuts, ice lollies). Overall work is the total sum of household chores, farm work, and 274 
market work. Finally, leisure time includes playing, watching TV, resting or sleeping, and visiting friends 275 
or family.  276 
Explanatory variables 277 
Ordering children residing in the same household by age and gender enabled us to sum the number of 278 
older and younger children for each child, and the number of older and younger boys and girls. 279 
Within households, the numbers of boys and girls enrolled in school were summed to give the total 280 
number of schoolboys and girls, and this number was subtracted from the total number of children in 281 
the household to give the number of out-of-school children. Similarly, the numbers of boys and girls 282 
within households were summed to give the total number of male and female children. We generated 283 
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an ‘age order’ variable by numbering children so that the eldest child in the household has age order 284 
1, the second child age order 2, and so on. We also generated an ‘age order by gender’ variable by 285 
ordering girls and boys separately by age and numbering them. 286 
Data analysis 287 
Multiple children are sampled per household, however, likelihood-ratio tests comparing multi-level 288 
models with ordinary least squares regression indicate limited evidence for differences between model 289 
forms (Supplementary Material, Table S2), and exploratory analyses confirm that multilevel analysis 290 
does not substantively alter our overall pattern of results. For enrolment analyses, we therefore use 291 
logistic regression models. Distributions of time use data usually contain many zeros. An individual child 292 
may not engage in certain activities, for example a child who is not enrolled in school does not spend 293 
time in education, while a child whose household does not keep cattle does not spend time cattle 294 
herding, leading to structural zeros. Additionally, sampling zeros arise because a child may not do the 295 
activity during the sampling period. These zeros violate the assumption of normality, making common 296 
approaches such as linear regression or tobit models inappropriate. Additionally, time use data are 297 
often right-skewed and over-dispersed. The Poisson-gamma distribution, or negative binomial 298 
regression, is more flexible and can model both exact zeros and a continuous component, so this is the 299 
approach we use here (Brown & Dunn, 2011). 300 
Analyses are stratified by gender, but we do not directly test for differences in outcomes between 301 
boys and girls because we have explored this in detail elsewhere (Hedges et al., 2018). We include 302 
covariates that we believe to be associated with the explanatory variables and outcomes of interest. 303 
Child’s age is associated with both work and education; previous work suggested a linear relationship 304 
between age and work, and a U-shaped relationship between age and education (Hedges et al., 305 
2018). We investigated using an age-squared term but this had no impact on the overall results, and 306 
so for simplicity we present analyses using the linear age term. In this area, fostering is relatively 307 
common, with many children living with close kin (mainly grandparents) and a few with more distant 308 
relatives. As older children are more likely to be fostered, we include a control for child residence (with 309 
parents, close kin, or distant kin) in age order analyses, and also repeat age order analyses for non-310 
fostered children only, in order to investigate whether age order effects are separate from fostering 311 
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effects. We include a variable indicating town or village residence. Household resource availability is 312 
likely to be associated with household composition, and to affect educational investment and time 313 
allocation. In this context, food security was felt to be the best measure of household resources, as it 314 
provides a contemporary measure of resource availability, meaningful across the different livelihoods 315 
in this area. We also use a categorical asset variable, indicating whether households own basic, 316 
intermediate, or higher value assets.  317 
We use the number of older children as a predictor together with the number of younger children, to 318 
compare the effects of having older substitutes with the effects of having younger children for whom to 319 
substitute, but do not include a variable indicating the total number of children in the household to 320 
avoid over-adjusting. In order to further compare the effects of being later-born independently of the 321 
total number of children, we ran additional sensitivity analyses (presented in Supplementary Material), 322 
with models including the overall age variable and the total number of children in the household, 323 
acknowledging that there is some multicollinearity between variables. We finally conducted additional 324 
analyses to explore age order effects in more detail by using a categorical age order variable to 325 
compare oldest, middle, and youngest children. All analyses are carried out in Stata. 326 
Results 327 
Household and child characteristics 328 
Household size ranges widely, with a mean of 7.6 members, and  3.1 children aged 7 to 19 (Table 1). 329 
Nearly three-quarters of households farm (i.e. grow crops or keep animals), while around a quarter of 330 
households keep cattle. 19% of households have only basic assets, 59% have intermediate assets such 331 
as a bicycle or a radio, and 21% have higher value assets such as a TV or fridge. Around half of 332 
households are classed as food insecure.  333 
81% of children are currently enrolled in school, with enrolment being higher for girls (Table 2; see 334 
also Hedges et al., 2018). Very few children in our sample have no siblings. Around a third only have 335 
full siblings, while just over half have both full siblings and half siblings, and around 12% only have 336 
half siblings. However, as the household roster is completed with household members’ relationship to 337 
the household head, we do not have direct information on the relationships of household members to 338 
each other, and cannot therefore be sure which children have siblings or half-siblings resident. 26% of 339 
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children live apart from their parents; most of these children live with close kin (grandparents, aunts or 340 
uncles), while some live with more distant kin. Girls are more likely than boys to live with distant kin. 341 
Seven per cent of children have no co-resident children aged 7-19; girls are more likely than boys to 342 
be an only child (chi-squared = 3.7, p=0.06). We exclude these children from our main analyses as 343 
they do not have substitute labourers available. Boys who are only children are marginally more likely 344 
to be enrolled than other boys, while girls who are only children do not differ in their enrolment, but do 345 
spend more time in household chores than girls with co-resident children (Supplementary Material (SM), 346 
Table S1).  347 
Prediction 1: Increasing age order (living with older children) will be associated with increased 348 
enrolment, decreased work, and increased leisure time 349 
We find different effects of the number of older children for boys and girls (Table 3; Fig. 2). For boys, 350 
in contrast to our prediction, an increasing number of older children (both boys and girls) is associated 351 
with a lower probability of enrolment, though this association is not statistically significant. The number 352 
of younger children in the household however is associated with a greater probability of enrolment. 353 
For girls the association is consistent with our prediction; the number of older children in the household 354 
increases the probability of enrolment. The same associations are seen when looking at number of 355 
older or younger children of the same gender. The effects of the age order variables echo these 356 
findings; increasing age order is associated with lower probability of enrolment for boys, and higher 357 
probability of enrolment for girls (results shown in SM, Table S2). For both genders, living in town 358 
(versus village), and having more household assets increase the probability of being enrolled; while 359 
these associations are not always significant, the odds ratios indicate a greater effect for boys than for 360 
girls. There is some suggestion that being fostered by distant kin is negative for enrolment, while 361 
increasing age is associated with lower odds of being enrolled. 362 
We further predicted that living with older children would be associated with doing less work and 363 
having more leisure time. Table 4 presents the incidence rate ratios (IRR) from negative binomial 364 
regression models of overall work and leisure time (for boys), and chores and leisure time (for girls). 365 
The IRR indicates the effect of the independent variable on the expected number of events. For 366 
example, in the first column, a boy enrolled in school experiences 0.3 times the events (half-hours of 367 
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work) an out-of-school boy experiences. For both genders, there is little association between the 368 
overall number of older and younger children and time spent in work or leisure time. However, as work 369 
is primarily shared between children of the same gender, it may be more relevant to examine the 370 
effect of older and younger children of the same gender. Again, for boys there is little association 371 
between number of older and younger boys and work or leisure time, though there is a non-significant 372 
trend of more work and less leisure as the number of younger boys increases (Fig. 2). For girls, the 373 
number of older children is associated with marginally more leisure time (Table 4), while the number of 374 
older girls is associated with less time spent doing chores and more time spent in leisure (Fig. 2). 375 
Models using age order and age order by gender give similar results; there are no associations 376 
between age order and work or leisure time for boys or girls, but increasing age order among 377 
household girls is associated with more chores and less leisure time for girls, with oldest girls doing 378 
more chores and having least leisure time overall (SM, Table S3). Additionally, girls who live only with 379 
boys appear to do slightly more work and have slightly less leisure time, while boys who reside only 380 
with girls appear to do slightly less productive work (SM, Fig. S1). 381 
There is some evidence for labour substitution between girls, with both older girls, and those living only 382 
with boys working more. This appears to improve school enrolment for girls living with more older girls. 383 
For boys however, the association between number of older children and enrolment is the opposite to 384 
that predicted, and there is little evidence of labour substitution of older boys for younger ones. This 385 
may be because cattle herding is traditionally been allocated to younger boys. We therefore tested 386 
for an interaction between cattle ownership and number of younger boys, to see whether the positive 387 
effect of younger boys on enrolment is confined to households that own cattle, but the interaction was 388 
not significant (Table 5). We then looked at time spent herding in households that own cattle, to see if 389 
there is evidence of younger boys substituting for older boys’ herding work. Having more younger 390 
boys in the household was associated with less time spent herding. This suggests that younger boys may 391 
substitute for older boys’ herding.  392 
Prediction 2: Substitution between schoolchildren and out-of-school children 393 
Our second prediction was that out-of-school children would work more in households with more 394 
schoolchildren, while schoolchildren would work less in households with more out-of-school children. For 395 
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out-of-school girls, living with more schoolboys marginally decreases time spent doing chores (Table 6). 396 
This is the opposite of what we expected. Out-of-school girls may take on schoolboys’ other tasks, such 397 
as farming or market work, with schoolboys taking on girls’ chores, which are more easily combined 398 
with school. However, we do not find other evidence of this, for example schoolboys do not affect out-399 
of-school girls’ time spent in farm work (results not shown). In line with our prediction, we do see that 400 
out-of-school girls do more chores when there are more schoolgirls, suggesting they may be 401 
preferentially allocated household chores. We find no evidence that the number of out-of-school 402 
children is associated with reduced work for schoolchildren (SM, Table S4).  403 
Prediction 3: Substitution between boys and girls for gendered work 404 
Finally, we predicted that girls would reduce boys’ time spent in chores, while boys would reduce girls’ 405 
time spent in farm work. Figure 3 indicates that girls do appear to substitute for boys’ chores, with 406 
boys living with five co-resident girls spending around 2 hours less per day doing household chores 407 
compared to boys living with no co-resident girls. While the trend for girls suggests boys do substitute 408 
somewhat for girls’ farm work, this result does not reach statistical significance (SM, Table S5). This may 409 
be because girls and boys do different types of farm work. The confidence intervals for girls living 410 
with one or zero boys are also very large, suggesting that farming households may have more boys, 411 
meaning it is rare for girls to live in farming households with few boys. Households that farm do have 412 
slightly more boys on average (1.6 compared to 1.3, t=-1.79, p=0.04). This may explain why there is 413 
not strong evidence that boys substitute for girls’ farm work.  414 
Discussion 415 
In contexts where households remain reliant on subsistence livelihoods, the value of children’s work 416 
according to their age and gender is likely to be an important determinant of educational investment. 417 
We investigated predictions derived from embodied capital theory regarding the distribution of 418 
investment, and economic theory on labour substitution. Our first prediction was that (relatively) older 419 
children within households would be preferentially allocated work and therefore be less likely to be 420 
enrolled in school. We support this prediction for girls only, finding that older girls are preferentially 421 
allocated work, and that the presence of older girls is associated with a higher probability of school 422 
enrolment for younger girls, who also spend less time in household chores and more time in leisure. For 423 
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boys, we find the opposite; boys with more younger boys in the household have the highest odds of 424 
school enrolment. Older boys do not work less than younger boys, however, except that younger boys 425 
in cattle-owning households are preferentially allocated herding work, suggesting that younger boys 426 
may be substituting for the labour of older boys in cattle-herding households at least. We discuss our 427 
interpretation of this pattern of results below. 428 
Our second prediction was that out-of-school children would substitute for the work of schoolchildren, 429 
whose time spent in other activities such as studying might be more valuable. Overall we did not find 430 
strong support for this prediction, although out-of-school girls do work more when there are more 431 
schoolgirls in the household, suggesting they may be taking over some of the schoolgirls’ chores. 432 
Schoolchildren did not work less in households with out-of-school children. This may be because 433 
household responsibilities are valued as part of a child’s socialization and duties to their household, 434 
with past work among the Sukuma noting that parents believe that children should help their household 435 
in order to stop them getting ‘spoiled’ (Varkevisser, 1973). During our study, the majority of parents or 436 
guardians agreed that it is important and useful for children to help with household work. Work may 437 
therefore also be a way for children to gain embodied capital, in the form of skills or experience that 438 
they cannot learn in school, and so parents may perceive that household work is beneficial for all 439 
children, rather than preferring that unenrolled children substitute for schoolchildren.  440 
Finally, we predicted that labour substitution would be gendered, given established differences in 441 
male and female work in this context (Hedges et al., 2018). Supporting our prediction, we find that the 442 
availability of girls within a household reduces the time spent by boys in household chores. There is less 443 
evidence that boys substitute for girls in farm work. This may be due to preferential fostering of boys 444 
into farming households, although we lack supporting data to test this conjecture. It may also reflect 445 
lower autonomy of girls, who may be less able to avoid being allocated work.  446 
Why are results more consistent with labour substitution for girls than boys? 447 
We predicted that work would be preferentially allocated to older individuals because skill and 448 
strength generally increase with age, meaning older individuals will be more efficient. For girls, this is 449 
the pattern that we observe. As our analyses are based on cross-sectional data, it is possible that this 450 
could partially reflect cohort effects such as increasing education rates or changes in children’s work. 451 
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However, given that it is boys’ farm work that has changed the most in recent years, rather than girls’ 452 
domestic work which has remained similar, and as these results remain after adjustment for child age, 453 
we are not convinced that these age order patterns can be explained as cohort effects. In contrast to 454 
girls, boys seem to benefit in terms of school enrolment when there are more younger boys available in 455 
a household. This cannot easily be explained by younger boys substituting for older boys’ work, as 456 
only in cattle-owning households is the number of younger boys associated with older boys doing less 457 
work.  458 
This pattern is the opposite to what we predicted, as labour substitution models predict that more 459 
skilled or productive individuals should be preferred for household labour. It may instead reflect 460 
traditional practices regarding inheritance and age hierarchies within families. In traditional Sukuma 461 
law, early-born sons were favoured, inheriting more land and taking the role of household head if 462 
their father died (Varkevisser, 1973). This early-born preference is also in line with evolutionary 463 
predictions about parental investment biases. In this area, a son’s marriage requires parents to pay 464 
brideprice, whereas a daughter’s marriage brings cattle or money into the household. Parents may 465 
therefore delay certain sons’ marriages in order to afford the brideprice, whereas daughters’ 466 
marriages are less restricted. As earlier-born boys can marry earlier, prioritizing their marriage and 467 
reproduction gives the greatest return to investment in the long-term. A similar pattern was observed 468 
among Gabbra pastoralists in Kenya, where older sons had much higher reproductive success than 469 
younger sons, but daughters’ reproduction wasn’t much influenced by birth order (Mace, 1996). This 470 
preference for earlier-born sons may also manifest in the allocation of work to younger sons where 471 
possible, to free older sons’ time for other activities, or just to relieve them from the discomforts of tasks 472 
such as cattle herding. This tradition of a family age hierarchy appears to continue into the present 473 
day, with parents preferring to invest in earlier-born boys’ education.  474 
A lack of strong labour substitution effects overall for boys echoes findings from our previous study, 475 
which showed minimal trade-offs between work and school for boys not involved in herding work 476 
(Hedges et al., 2018). In the local area, livelihoods have shifted away from subsistence agriculture, 477 
and landholdings and herd sizes have decreased, reducing the demand for boys’ work (Wijsen & 478 
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Tanner, 2002). This appears to make boys’ everyday work quite compatible with school, eliminating 479 
the need for substitution between boys not in cattle-owning households.  480 
Girls’ labour substitution fits better with predictions from embodied capital models. Household chores 481 
such as food processing and cooking may be more sensitive to the gains in efficiency associated with 482 
gains in skill. Additionally, chores are frequently combined with being responsible for any other 483 
children present. In this case, it is beneficial to have the most senior girl available to do this, as she will 484 
have the most experience and authority. The value of older girls’ work was also seen in our previous 485 
study, in which the trade-off in time allocation between work and school was much greater among 486 
older than younger girls, suggesting that the opportunity costs of girls’ work increase with age (Hedges 487 
et al., 2018).  488 
Birth order, education, and modernization 489 
Labour substitution effects may help to explain some of the varied results regarding differential 490 
investment by birth order reviewed in our introduction. Where children are still producers, their work 491 
contributions are likely to influence decisions about investment in education, favouring children whose 492 
work is less important to the household. However, as livelihoods shift away from subsistence agriculture 493 
towards market integration or formal work, and children’s contributions become less important to their 494 
households, parents may invest more in earlier-born children. This may explain why early-born biases 495 
in education are more evident in industrialized countries, where children are primarily consumers and 496 
make negligible work contributions to their households (e.g. Price, 2008; Steelman, Powell, Werum, & 497 
Carter, 2002). Studies in lower-income settings have found that age order biases in education are 498 
more evident in wealthier households (Gibson & Lawson, 2011; Gibson & Sear, 2010; Hedges et al., 499 
2016). This may be because wealthier households are less reliant on children’s work, being more able 500 
to hire outside help or because they are less reliant on subsistence farming.  501 
This may also help to explain the differing effects of family size on education during the course of the 502 
demographic transition. Economic theory predicts a quantity-quality trade-off between family size and 503 
educational investment, such that in larger families, there are fewer resources available per child, and 504 
so children are less likely to be educated (Becker, 1960). However, in many pre-transition societies 505 
children are producers as well as consumers, alleviating the trade-off between quantity and quality of 506 
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children (Kramer, 2011). Across Africa, many studies actually report a positive effect of the number of 507 
siblings or co-resident children on schooling, perhaps because children have a lower individual burden 508 
of work (Al-Samarrai & Peasgood, 1998; Chernichovsky, 1985; Cornwell, Inder, Maitra, & Rammohan, 509 
2005; Gomes, 1984; Lloyd & Blanc, 1996; Roth, 1991). However this effect appears to reduce then 510 
reverse as modernization and fertility decline occur (Eloundou-Enyegue & Williams, 2006; Marteleto, 511 
2010). In pre-transition settings the payoffs to education are frequently uncertain due to poor quality 512 
schools and high youth unemployment, meaning parents may benefit more by pursuing a ‘bet-hedging’ 513 
strategy, or by using older children’s work to reduce the opportunity costs of younger children’s 514 
schooling (Liddell et al., 2003). Both wealth and modernization improve the payoffs to education and 515 
reduce the value of children’s work, as households become less reliant on subsistence farming, and no 516 
longer have to fetch water and fuel. As modernization occurs, it may therefore become more beneficial 517 
to parents to bias investment towards earlier-born children, and ultimately to limit fertility. 518 
Limitations 519 
Data on household composition were collected through a household roster, with all individuals in the 520 
household linked to the household head. This means it is difficult to subsequently relate other individuals 521 
within the household to one another. We can link biological children of the household head together as 522 
siblings, but we do not know whether they are half or full siblings, and for other children, it is difficult 523 
to reconstruct relationships other than that with the household head. This is a common limitation of 524 
demographic data, but one which has not often been questioned (Madhavan, Myroniuk, Kuhn, & 525 
Collinson, 2017; Randall, Coast, & Leone, 2011). An additional limitation of the household roster 526 
approach is that it assumes that household members have equal access to household resources, when in 527 
fact there may be within-household differences in food security or access to assets, and involvement in 528 
household decision-making (Randall, Coast, & Leone, 2011). 529 
This study is also limited by its cross-sectional nature, introducing the possibility that age differences 530 
may partially be explained through cohort effects, for example due to rising education rates or 531 
changes in children’s work. While we do not think that this is the case for reasons discussed above, 532 
longitudinal data would allow these trends to be more thoroughly investigated, and enable changes 533 
over a household’s lifetime to be investigated, for example whether it is the timing or overall level of 534 
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investment that differs by age order. If work tasks change considerably with age (rather than just skill 535 
or productivity in tasks) it might be expected that labour substitution would predominantly occur 536 
between children of similar ages, while those of different ages might specialize in different work. We 537 
do not have enough data on specific work tasks at different ages to investigate this here, but future 538 
work could further expand on age profiles of children’s work and the effects of household age 539 
configurations, for example comparing households with a wide age range of children with households 540 
with a narrower age range.  541 
Finally, we examine only one measure of educational investment, school enrolment. Progression through 542 
school or academic attainment may show different associations with household composition.  543 
Conclusion and Implications 544 
Embodied capital theory frames education as a form of parental investment in children’s embodied 545 
capital, while also recognizing the role of work in children’s skill acquisition and socialization. Research 546 
in this vein has focused primarily on the long-term benefits of educational investment and less on the 547 
short-term implications for children’s time allocation in contexts where children’s work remains valuable. 548 
By contrast, economic models of labor substitution have placed greater focus on the short-term costs 549 
and benefits of children’s time allocation. Bringing together literature from both these fields, we frame 550 
both work and education as forms of embodied capital, and consider how parental investment biases, 551 
alongside short-term economic considerations, affect children’s time allocation. We demonstrate that 552 
the presence and characteristics of other co-resident children have important implications for children’s 553 
work and education.  Work by relatively older girls enables younger girls’ to allocate more time to 554 
attend school, and out-of-school girls alleviate the burden of household chores for schoolgirls. For boys, 555 
traditional age hierarchies appear to favour older boys in education access, while a gendered 556 
allocation of household work is seen, with girls substituting for boys’ household chores. This study 557 
highlights the complexities of decision-making regarding educational investment and children’s time 558 
allocation in transitioning contexts, indicating that multiple factors influence these decisions, from the 559 
availability of substitute workers, the relative value of a child’s work contributions according to their 560 
age and gender, to traditional gender and family norms. We reinforce the importance of including 561 
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work in studies of children’s education in modernizing contexts, particularly recognizing the value of 562 
children’s work and its role in influencing education decisions within households. 563 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics about household characteristics 
Household composition Mean (SD) Range 
Household size 7.6 (3.1) 2 – 19 
Children aged 7-19 3.1 (1.7) 1 – 10 
Household characteristics (% households) 
Residence   
 Village 52.3%  
 Town 47.7%  
Household farms   
 No 26.6%  
 Yes 73.4%  
Household keeps cattle   
 No 73.9%  
 Yes 26.1%  
Household assets  
 Higher value 21.4%  
 Intermediate 59.2%  
 Basic 19.4%  
Household is food insecure   
 No 50.3%  
 Yes 49.7%  
N  441  
32 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on child characteristics by gender 
 Male Female Total 
N 632 641 1,273 
Currently enrolled in education    
No 20.6% 17.5% 19.0% 
Yes 79.4% 82.5% 81.0% 
Age order within household    
Only child 5.5% 8.3% 6.9% 
Oldest 26.3% 22.8% 24.5% 
Middle child 41.5% 40.9% 41.2% 
Youngest 26.7% 28.1% 27.4% 
Child lives with    
Parent(s) 76.1% 72.4% 74.2% 
Close kin 18.1% 18.9% 18.5% 
Distant kin 5.9% 8.7% 7.3% 
Types of siblings    
No siblings 3.2% 3.0% 3.1% 
Only half-siblings 10.0% 13.1% 11.5% 
Only full siblings 35.8% 32.0% 33.9% 
Full siblings and maternal half-siblings 15.3% 14.8% 15.1% 
Full siblings and paternal half-siblings 26.1% 25.6% 25.8% 




Table 3: Models testing prediction 1, that increasing age order (i.e. living with more older children) will be associated with higher odds of school 
enrolment. Models were run separately for boys and girls and adjust for (1) number of younger and older children, and (2) number of younger and 
older children of the same gender. 
                          Boys Boys Girls Girls 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Number of younger children 1.38**  1.08  
                          [1.11,1.72]  [0.87,1.33]  
Number of older children 0.9  1.58*  
                          [0.70,1.16]  [1.08,2.31]  
Number of younger boys / girls  1.45**  0.91 
                           [1.12,1.88]  [0.69,1.22] 
Number of older boys / girls  0.84  1.62† 
                           [0.61,1.16]  [0.95,2.75] 
Child lives with (reference = parent(s))     
Close kin                 0.82 0.75 2.06 2.06 
                          [0.41,1.63] [0.38,1.48] [0.81,5.24] [0.82,5.17] 
Distant kin               0.5 0.53 0.44† 0.46† 
                          [0.18,1.38] [0.19,1.51] [0.18,1.08] [0.19,1.12] 
Household food security   1.04† 1.04† 1.04 1.04 
                          [0.99,1.09] [0.99,1.09] [0.99,1.10] [0.99,1.10] 
Household assets (reference = basic)     
Higher value              2.87* 3.11* 1.52 1.8 
                          [1.01,8.17] [1.10,8.82] [0.48,4.84] [0.57,5.67] 
Intermediate value        1.81† 1.94† 1.62 1.83 
                          [0.91,3.58] [0.99,3.82] [0.69,3.81] [0.78,4.28] 
Town (reference = village) 5.40*** 5.04*** 2.53* 2.39* 
                          [2.73,10.67] [2.60,9.75] [1.23,5.19] [1.17,4.87] 
Age (years)               0.56*** 0.58*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 
                          [0.49,0.64] [0.52,0.65] [0.45,0.62] [0.45,0.61] 
N                         590 590 578 578 
Data shown are odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients) from logistic regression models; 95% confidence intervals in brackets 




Table 4: Models testing prediction 1, that increasing age order (i.e. living with more older children) will be associated with less time spent in work, 
and more time spent in leisure. Models were run separately for boys and girls and adjust for (1) number of younger and older children, and (2) 
number of younger and older children of the same gender. 
 Boys Girls Boys Girls 
                          Total work Leisure  Chores Leisure Total work Leisure  Chores Leisure 
 (1) (2) 
Number of younger 
children 1.04 1.02 0.99 0.98     
                          [0.97,1.12] [0.96,1.09] [0.94,1.04] [0.91,1.06]     
Number of older 
children 0.98 1.01 0.99 1.07†     
                          [0.92,1.05] [0.96,1.07] [0.94,1.03] [1.00,1.14]     
Number of younger 
boys / girls     1.04 0.97 1.02 0.98 
                              [0.94,1.14] [0.89,1.05] [0.95,1.09] [0.87,1.09] 
Number of older boys / 
girls     0.99 1 0.92* 1.12* 
                              [0.90,1.09] [0.93,1.08] [0.86,0.99] [1.01,1.23] 
Child lives with 
(reference = parent(s))         
Close kin                 1.02 0.94 1 1.04 1.01 0.96 1 1.05 
                          [0.81,1.27] [0.78,1.14] [0.86,1.18] [0.83,1.31] [0.81,1.27] [0.79,1.17] [0.86,1.18] [0.83,1.31] 
Distant kin               1.14 1.19 1.07 1.51* 1.14 1.2 1.08 1.50* 
                          [0.81,1.61] [0.89,1.60] [0.87,1.33] [1.10,2.08] [0.81,1.60] [0.90,1.61] [0.87,1.33] [1.09,2.06] 
Enrolled (reference = 
no)          0.34*** 0.45*** 0.58*** 0.24*** 0.34*** 0.46*** 0.58*** 0.24*** 
                          [0.27,0.43] [0.37,0.56] [0.49,0.70] [0.18,0.33] [0.27,0.43] [0.38,0.57] [0.49,0.69] [0.18,0.32] 
Household food security   1.01 0.99 1 1.02† 1 0.99 1 1.02* 
                          [0.99,1.02] [0.98,1.00] [0.99,1.01] [1.00,1.03] [0.99,1.02] [0.98,1.00] [0.99,1.01] [1.00,1.03] 
Household assets 
(reference = basic)         
Higher value              0.91 1.11 0.81† 1.08 0.91 1.14 0.82 1.09 
                          [0.65,1.26] [0.84,1.47] [0.64,1.03] [0.76,1.53] [0.66,1.27] [0.86,1.50] [0.65,1.04] [0.77,1.55] 
Intermediate value        0.95 1.09 0.94 0.92 0.95 1.12 0.94 0.94 
                          [0.75,1.20] [0.89,1.34] [0.80,1.12] [0.72,1.19] [0.75,1.20] [0.91,1.37] [0.79,1.11] [0.73,1.21] 
Town (reference = 
village) 0.71** 1.07 0.98 0.98 0.71*** 1.05 0.99 0.97 
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                          [0.58,0.87] [0.90,1.26] [0.85,1.13] [0.80,1.20] [0.57,0.87] [0.88,1.24] [0.86,1.13] [0.79,1.20] 
Monday interview 
(reference = other day) 
0.92 1 1.01 0.94 0.91 1 1.02 0.93 
[0.73,1.15] [0.82,1.21] [0.87,1.18] [0.75,1.18] [0.72,1.14] [0.82,1.21] [0.88,1.19] [0.74,1.17] 
Age (years)               0.98 0.94*** 1.05** 0.88*** 0.99 0.95*** 1.03* 0.87*** 
                          [0.95,1.03] [0.90,0.97] [1.02,1.08] [0.84,0.92] [0.96,1.03] [0.92,0.97] [1.01,1.06] [0.84,0.91] 
N                         590 590 578 578 590 590 578 578 
Data shown are incident rate ratios from negative binomial regression models; 95% confidence intervals in brackets  




Table 5: Models further exploring prediction 1, that the number of younger boys 
will be associated with higher odds of school enrolment in cattle-owning 
households, and in cattle-herding households, with less time spent herding. 
Models were run for boys only.  
 Enrolment 
(odds ratios)a 
Time spent herding 
(incident rate ratios)b 
Number of younger boys 1.37† 0.75* 
                          [0.98,1.91] [0.57,0.99] 
Cattle-owning household (reference = 
no cattle) 0.7  
                          [0.33,1.49]  
Cattle-owning household # number of 
younger boys interaction 1.12  
                          [0.72,1.76]  
Number of older boys 0.86 0.92 
                          [0.62,1.18] [0.57,1.49] 
Child lives with (reference = 
parent(s))   
Close kin                 0.75 0.98 
                          [0.38,1.50] [0.33,2.90] 
Distant kin               0.54 0.71 
                          [0.19,1.52] [0.11,4.56] 
Household food security   1.04† 1.08† 
                          [0.99,1.09] [1.00,1.17] 
Household assets (reference = basic)   
Higher value              3.38* 0.06** 
                          [1.16,9.85] [0.01,0.50] 
Intermediate value        2.03* 0.68 
                          [1.01,4.06] [0.19,2.49] 
Town (reference = village) 4.40*** 0.28 
                          [2.11,9.15] [0.04,2.13] 
Age (years)               0.58*** 0.82* 
37 
 
                          [0.52,0.65] [0.71,0.96] 
Enrolled (reference = no)  0.27* 
                           [0.09,0.79] 




N                         590 220 
a From logistic regression models b From negative binomial regression models 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 6: Models testing prediction 2, that out-of-school children will work more 
when co-resident with more schoolchildren. Models were run separately for out-of-
school boys and out-of-school girls, and adjust for (1) number of schoolboys, and 
(2) number of schoolgirls. 
                          Out-of-school boys Out-of-school girls 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Number of schoolboys 1.04  0.87†  
                          [0.93,1.17]  [0.75,1.01]  
Number of schoolgirls 
 0.97  1.23** 
                          
 [0.85,1.11]  [1.06,1.43] 
Number of school-age 
children 1.01 1.03 0.98 0.86** 
                          [0.91,1.11] [0.95,1.12] [0.89,1.08] [0.78,0.95] 
Household food security   1 1 1 1 
                          [0.98,1.02] [0.98,1.02] [0.98,1.02] [0.97,1.02] 
Household assets 
(reference = basic)     
Higher value              1.52 1.54 0.9 0.88 
                          [0.88,2.62] [0.88,2.69] [0.58,1.40] [0.57,1.35] 
Intermediate value        1.07 1.08 1.07 1.02 
                          [0.81,1.43] [0.81,1.44] [0.76,1.51] [0.73,1.43] 
Town (reference = 
village) 
                          
0.52*** 0.51*** 1.32* 1.28† 
[0.37,0.73] [0.36,0.73] [1.01,1.73] [0.99,1.67] 
Monday interview 
(reference = other day) 
1.01 1.01 1.13 1.12 
[0.71,1.43] [0.71,1.43] [0.82,1.56] [0.82,1.54] 
Age (years)               1.02 1.02 1.04 1.04 
                          [0.98,1.05] [0.98,1.06] [0.98,1.11] [0.98,1.10] 
N                         124 124 103 103 
Data shown are incident rate ratios; 95% confidence intervals in brackets 










































Fig. 2: Results from models testing prediction 1, that increasing age order will be associated with higher odds of school enrolment, less time spent in 790 
work, and more time spent in leisure. Models were run separately for boys and girls. School enrolment models show predicted probability of school 791 
enrolment from logistic regression models. Work and leisure models show predicted hours from negative binomial regression models. (95% confidence 792 







Fig. 3: Results from models testing prediction 3, that the number of co-resident opposite gender children will reduce time spent in gender-inappropriate 798 
work. Models were run separately for boys and girls and show predicted hours of work from negative binomial regression models. (95% confidence 799 
intervals shown) 800 
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Time spent in activity 
(incidence rate ratios) 









Only child (reference = no) 2.62 1.31 0.93 1.02 1.26* 0.97 
                          [0.73,9.39] [0.37,4.70] [0.64,1.37] [0.73,1.43] [1.00,1.59] [0.69,1.37] 
Child lives with (reference = parent(s))       
Close kin                 0.78 2.10† 1.03 0.94 1 1.05 
                          [0.40,1.51] [0.88,5.02] [0.83,1.27] [0.78,1.14] [0.86,1.17] [0.84,1.30] 
Distant kin               0.54 0.42* 1.13 1.19 1.08 1.43* 
                          [0.20,1.48] [0.19,0.96] [0.81,1.59] [0.89,1.60] [0.88,1.32] [1.06,1.93] 
Number of school-age children 1.19* 1.18† 1.01 1.02 0.99 1.03 
                          [1.01,1.39] [0.98,1.42] [0.96,1.06] [0.98,1.06] [0.95,1.02] [0.98,1.08] 
Household food security   1.04 1.04 1 0.99 1 1.01† 
                          [0.99,1.09] [0.99,1.09] [0.99,1.02] [0.98,1.00] [0.98,1.01] [1.00,1.03] 
Household assets (reference = basic)       
Higher value              2.33† 1.83 0.94 1.14 0.82† 1.12 
                          [0.85,6.40] [0.63,5.34] [0.68,1.29] [0.86,1.50] [0.65,1.03] [0.81,1.56] 
Intermediate value        1.74 1.76 0.97 1.07 0.97 0.98 
                          [0.89,3.39] [0.79,3.91] [0.77,1.22] [0.88,1.31] [0.82,1.14] [0.77,1.25] 
Town (reference = village) 5.01*** 2.86** 0.72** 1.03 0.96 1 
                          [2.63,9.55] [1.45,5.65] [0.59,0.87] [0.87,1.21] [0.84,1.10] [0.82,1.21] 
Age (years)               0.62*** 0.52*** 1 0.94*** 1.05*** 0.86*** 
                          [0.57,0.68] [0.46,0.59] [0.98,1.03] [0.92,0.96] [1.03,1.07] [0.83,0.89] 
Enrolled (reference = no)   0.34*** 0.46*** 0.58*** 0.25*** 
                            [0.27,0.42] [0.38,0.57] [0.49,0.69] [0.19,0.32] 
Monday interview (reference = other 
day) 
  0.93 0.97 1.01 0.95 
  [0.75,1.16] [0.80,1.18] [0.88,1.17] [0.76,1.18] 
N                         624 631 624 624 631 631 
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Data shown are odds ratios / incidence rate ratios; 95% confidence intervals in brackets 
43 
 
Table S2: Multi-level models testing prediction 1, that increasing age order (i.e. living with more older children) will be associated with higher odds of 
school enrolment. Models were run separately for boys and girls and adjust for (1) number of younger and older children, and (2) number of younger 
and older children of the same gender. Models include a household random effect. 
                          Boys Boys Girls Girls 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Number of younger children 1.34*  1.02  
                          [1.07,1.67]  [0.79,1.31]  
Number of older children 0.84  1.84*  
                          [0.63,1.11]  [1.15,2.96]  
Number of younger boys / girls  1.48*  0.85 
                           [1.10,1.99]  [0.58,1.24] 
Number of older boys / girls  0.77  2.06* 
                           [0.53,1.11]  [1.03,4.08] 
Child lives with (reference = parent(s))     
Close kin                 0.82 0.74 2.33 2.33 
                          [0.39,1.71] [0.35,1.58] [0.77,7.04] [0.74,7.34] 
Distant kin               0.52 0.54 0.29* 0.26* 
                          [0.17,1.60] [0.17,1.73] [0.09,0.99] [0.07,0.97] 
Household food security   1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 
                          [0.98,1.09] [0.98,1.09] [0.97,1.11] [0.97,1.12] 
Household assets (reference = basic)     
Higher value              2.56 2.81† 2.12 2.94 
                          [0.80,8.17] [0.85,9.26] [0.47,9.51] [0.59,14.59] 
Intermediate value        1.87 2.00† 1.94 2.39 
                          [0.87,4.01] [0.91,4.37] [0.67,5.61] [0.78,7.36] 
Town (reference = village)         6.95*** 6.91*** 3.77** 3.56* 
                          [3.07,15.74] [2.99,15.93] [1.44,9.88] [1.31,9.62] 
Age (years)               0.53*** 0.54*** 0.50*** 0.48*** 
                          [0.44,0.63] [0.46,0.63] [0.39,0.66] [0.37,0.63] 
Household random effect 0.59 0.77 1.78 2.33 
 [0.09,4.12] [0.14,4.22] [0.27,11.56] [0.44,12.4] 
Likelihood ratio test versus logistic model 1.57 2.21 2.76† 4.12* 
N                         624 624 631 631 
Exponentiated coefficients; 95% confidence intervals in brackets 
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table S3: Association between (1) continuous age order and enrolment and (2) categorical age order and enrolment, 
for boys and girls, from logistic regression models 
                          Boys Boys Girls Girls 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Age order (continuous)         0.61**  1.47†  
                          [0.43,0.86]  [0.97,2.23]  
Age order (reference = youngest)     
Middle child               0.75  1.48 
                           [0.39,1.42]  [0.71,3.07] 
Youngest                   0.38*  3.23† 
                           [0.15,1.00]  [0.83,12.53] 
Number of children 1.43** 1.18† 1.08 1.18 
                          [1.15,1.79] [0.99,1.41] [0.87,1.34] [0.95,1.48] 
Child lives with (reference = parent(s))     
Close kin                 0.8 0.83 2.04 2.08 
                          [0.40,1.59] [0.41,1.65] [0.80,5.18] [0.80,5.37] 
Distant kin               0.44 0.48 0.42† 0.45† 
                          [0.15,1.22] [0.17,1.36] [0.17,1.03] [0.19,1.10] 
Household food security   1.04† 1.04† 1.04 1.04 
                          [0.99,1.09] [1.00,1.09] [0.99,1.10] [0.99,1.10] 
Household assets (reference = basic)     
Higher value              2.99* 2.63† 1.49 1.55 
                          [1.04,8.54] [0.93,7.39] [0.47,4.77] [0.48,4.97] 
Intermediate value        1.83† 1.77 1.64 1.63 
                          [0.92,3.64] [0.90,3.49] [0.70,3.88] [0.68,3.91] 
Town (reference = village)              5.58*** 5.07*** 2.55* 2.54* 
                          [2.81,11.07] [2.61,9.84] [1.24,5.24] [1.24,5.22] 
Age (years)               0.54*** 0.59*** 0.53*** 0.52*** 
                          [0.47,0.62] [0.52,0.66] [0.46,0.63] [0.45,0.61] 
N                         590 590 578 578 
Data shown are odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients); 95% confidence intervals in brackets 
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table S4: Association between (1) age order and (2) age order by gender, and time spent in work and leisure for boys and girls, from negative 
binomial regression models 
 Boys Girls 
                          Work Leisure Work Leisure Chores Leisure Chores Leisure 
 (1) (1) (2) (2) (1) (1) (2) (2) 
Age order                 0.92 0.98   1.01 1.08   
                          [0.83,1.02] [0.90,1.07]   [0.94,1.08] [0.97,1.21]   
Age order by gender         0.96 0.99   0.91* 1.1 
                            [0.85,1.07] [0.90,1.08]   [0.84,0.98] [0.98,1.23] 
Enrolled (reference = no) 0.33*** 0.45*** 0.34*** 0.45*** 0.58*** 0.24*** 0.58*** 0.24*** 
                          [0.26,0.42] [0.36,0.56] [0.27,0.43] [0.37,0.56] [0.49,0.70] [0.18,0.32] [0.48,0.69] [0.18,0.32] 
Number of school-age children 1.06 1.03 1.02 1.02 0.98 0.98 1.01 1.01 
                          [0.98,1.13] [0.96,1.09] [0.97,1.08] [0.97,1.07] [0.93,1.04] [0.90,1.07] [0.97,1.05] [0.95,1.07] 
Child lives with (reference = parent(s))         
Close kin                 1.02 0.94 1.02 0.94 1 1.05 1.02 1.04 
                          [0.81,1.27] [0.77,1.14] [0.81,1.27] [0.77,1.14] [0.86,1.18] [0.83,1.32] [0.87,1.19] [0.83,1.31] 
Distant kin               1.14 1.19 1.13 1.19 1.07 1.52* 1.07 1.50* 
                          [0.81,1.61] [0.89,1.59] [0.80,1.60] [0.89,1.60] [0.87,1.33] [1.10,2.09] [0.87,1.33] [1.09,2.07] 
Household food security   1.01 0.99 1 0.99 1 1.02† 1 1.02* 
                          [0.99,1.02] [0.98,1.00] [0.99,1.02] [0.98,1.00] [0.99,1.01] [1.00,1.03] [0.99,1.01] [1.00,1.03] 
Household assets (reference = basic)         
Higher value              0.91 1.11 0.91 1.11 0.81† 1.09 0.83 1.07 
                          [0.65,1.26] [0.84,1.47] [0.65,1.27] [0.84,1.47] [0.64,1.03] [0.77,1.54] [0.65,1.05] [0.76,1.52] 
Intermediate value        0.95 1.09 0.95 1.09 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.93 
                          [0.75,1.21] [0.89,1.34] [0.75,1.20] [0.89,1.34] [0.80,1.12] [0.72,1.20] [0.80,1.12] [0.72,1.19] 
Town (reference = village)      0.71** 1.07 0.70*** 1.06 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.99 
                          [0.58,0.87] [0.90,1.26] [0.57,0.87] [0.90,1.26] [0.85,1.12] [0.80,1.20] [0.85,1.12] [0.81,1.22] 
Monday interview (reference = other 
day) 
0.92 1 0.92 1 1.01 0.94 1.02 0.93 
[0.73,1.15] [0.82,1.21] [0.73,1.15] [0.82,1.21] [0.87,1.18] [0.75,1.18] [0.88,1.19] [0.74,1.16] 
Age (years)               0.98 0.94*** 0.99 0.94*** 1.05*** 0.88*** 1.04** 0.87*** 
                          [0.94,1.02] [0.90,0.97] [0.96,1.03] [0.91,0.96] [1.02,1.08] [0.84,0.92] [1.01,1.06] [0.84,0.90] 
N                         590 590 590 590 578 578 578 578 




Table S5: Associations between (1) number of younger and older children, and (2) number of younger and older 
children of the same gender, and school enrolment, for non-fostered children only 
                          Boys Boys Girls Girls 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Number of younger children 1.47**  1.1  
                          [1.14,1.90]  [0.85,1.43]  
Number of older children 0.8  2.08**  
                          [0.59,1.08]  [1.29,3.33]  
Number of younger boys / girls  1.67**  0.86 
                           [1.23,2.27]  [0.62,1.18] 
Number of older boys / girls  0.75  1.61 
                           [0.52,1.10]  [0.90,2.91] 
Household food security   1.02 1.02 1.03 1.04 
                          [0.96,1.08] [0.97,1.08] [0.97,1.10] [0.98,1.11] 
Household assets (reference = basic)     
Higher value              4.03* 4.24* 1.25 1.44 
                          [1.14,14.22] [1.20,14.96] [0.32,4.82] [0.38,5.42] 
Intermediate value        1.96 1.99† 2.07 2.32† 
                          [0.88,4.39] [0.89,4.47] [0.79,5.37] [0.91,5.94] 
Town (reference = village) 4.45*** 4.22*** 2.74* 2.54* 
                          [2.05,9.67] [2.00,8.91] [1.16,6.46] [1.10,5.84] 
Age (years)               0.53*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.55*** 
                          [0.45,0.62] [0.49,0.64] [0.47,0.67] [0.46,0.64] 
N                         453 453 425 425 
Data shown are odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients); 95% confidence intervals in brackets 
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 




Table S6: Associations between (1) number of younger and older children, and (2) number of younger and older children of the same gender, and 
time spent in work and leisure for boys and girls, for non-fostered children only 
 Boys Girls Boys Girls 
                          Total work Leisure  Chores Leisure Total work Leisure  Chores Leisure 
 (1) (2) 
Number of younger children 1.05 1.04 0.96 1.03     
                          [0.97,1.14] [0.96,1.12] [0.90,1.02] [0.93,1.15]     
Number of older children 1.01 1 1 1.07     
                          [0.93,1.09] [0.94,1.07] [0.94,1.05] [0.98,1.17]     
Number of younger boys / girls     1.05 0.95 1 1.01 
                              [0.94,1.17] [0.86,1.05] [0.93,1.08] [0.88,1.15] 
Number of older boys / girls     1.01 1 0.92* 1.11† 
                              [0.90,1.14] [0.91,1.09] [0.85,0.99] [0.99,1.25] 
Enrolled (reference = no)          0.35*** 0.41*** 0.55*** 0.23*** 0.35*** 0.43*** 0.55*** 0.23*** 
                          [0.27,0.46] [0.32,0.52] [0.45,0.67] [0.16,0.33] [0.27,0.46] [0.34,0.55] [0.45,0.66] [0.17,0.33] 
Household food security   1 0.99 1 1.01 1 0.99 1 1.01 
                          [0.99,1.02] [0.97,1.00] [0.99,1.02] [0.99,1.03] [0.99,1.02] [0.97,1.00] [0.99,1.02] [0.99,1.03] 
Household assets (reference = basic)         
Higher value              0.94 1.1 0.77† 1.21 0.96 1.12 0.80† 1.22 
                          [0.64,1.37] [0.79,1.53] [0.59,1.01] [0.80,1.84] [0.66,1.39] [0.81,1.56] [0.61,1.04] [0.80,1.85] 
Intermediate value        1.08 1.1 1.02 0.96 1.09 1.13 1.02 0.98 
                          [0.82,1.43] [0.87,1.41] [0.85,1.23] [0.71,1.29] [0.83,1.44] [0.89,1.45] [0.85,1.23] [0.73,1.31] 
Town (reference = village) 0.71** 1.06 0.98 1.11 0.70** 1.04 0.99 1.09 
                          [0.56,0.89] [0.88,1.29] [0.84,1.14] [0.87,1.41] [0.56,0.88] [0.86,1.26] [0.85,1.15] [0.85,1.39] 
Monday interview (reference = other 
day) 
0.87 0.93 1.02 1.03 0.85 0.93 1.03 1.02 
[0.67,1.13] [0.74,1.18] [0.86,1.20] [0.79,1.35] [0.65,1.11] [0.74,1.17] [0.87,1.21] [0.78,1.33] 
Age (years)               0.98 0.93*** 1.06*** 0.85*** 0.99 0.95** 1.03* 0.86*** 
                          [0.94,1.03] [0.89,0.97] [1.02,1.09] [0.81,0.90] [0.96,1.03] [0.92,0.98] [1.01,1.06] [0.82,0.90] 
N                         453 453 425 425 453 453 425 425 
Data shown are incident rate ratios; 95% confidence intervals in brackets † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table S7: Association between (1) number of out-of-school boys and time spent in work  and (2) number of out-of-school girls and time spent in 
work, for schoolboys and schoolgirls 
                          Schoolboys Schoolgirls 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Number of out-of-school boys 1.03  1.08  
                          [0.85,1.23]  [0.97,1.20]  
Number of out-of-school girls  0.91  0.99 
                           [0.74,1.11]  [0.88,1.12] 
Number of school-age children 1.01 1.02 0.99 1 
                          [0.95,1.07] [0.96,1.08] [0.95,1.03] [0.96,1.04] 
Household food security   1.01 1.01 1 1 
                          [0.99,1.03] [0.99,1.02] [0.98,1.01] [0.98,1.01] 
Household assets (reference = basic)     
Higher value              0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 
                          [0.55,1.22] [0.55,1.22] [0.63,1.10] [0.63,1.09] 
Intermediate value        0.89 0.9 0.92 0.92 
                          [0.65,1.20] [0.66,1.22] [0.76,1.11] [0.76,1.11] 
Town (reference = village) 0.76* 0.75* 0.91 0.89 
                          [0.59,0.98] [0.59,0.96] [0.77,1.07] [0.76,1.05] 
Monday interview (reference = other day) 0.9 0.91 0.98 0.98 
 [0.68,1.19] [0.69,1.20] [0.83,1.16] [0.83,1.16] 
Age (years)               0.99 0.99 1.05*** 1.05*** 
                          [0.96,1.03] [0.96,1.03] [1.03,1.08] [1.03,1.08] 
N                         466 466 475 475 
Data shown are incident rate ratios; 95% confidence intervals in brackets; † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table S8: Association between number of co-resident girls and boys’ time spent in household chores, and 
number of co-resident boys and girls’ time spent in farm work 
                          Boys Girls 
Number of co-resident girls         0.84**  
                          [0.73,0.96]  
Number of co-resident boys           0.77 
                           [0.54,1.09] 
Number of school-age children 1.09 1.19 
                          [0.98,1.20] [0.90,1.55] 
Enrolled (reference = no) 0.70* 0.10*** 
                          [0.49,0.99] [0.04,0.26] 
Household food security   1 0.99 
                          [0.98,1.02] [0.93,1.04] 
Household assets (reference = basic)   
Higher value              1.08 0.19* 
                          [0.68,1.72] [0.05,0.73] 
Intermediate value        1.07 1.1 
                          [0.77,1.48] [0.47,2.58] 
Town (reference = village) 1.73*** 0.08*** 
                          [1.31,2.29] [0.04,0.18] 
Monday interview (reference = other day) 0.79 1.03 
 [0.57,1.11] [0.50,2.13] 
Age (years)               0.99 1.05 
                          [0.95,1.03] [0.93,1.19] 
N                         625 631 
Data shown are incident rate ratios; 95% confidence intervals in brackets 
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table S2: Association between younger children and boys' enrolment, work time and leisure time, and older children and girls' enrolment, chore time 847 
and leisure time, for non-fostered children only 848 
 849 
